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BRIDGING THE DIVIDE? THEORIES FOR INTEGRATING
COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
MAX HUFFMAN*
Commissioner Kovacic of the US Federal Trade Commission has stated that
“consumer protection laws are important complements to competition policy”.1
According to the UK Office of Fair Trading, “[c]ompetition and consumer
policy are interdependent”; together they “provide a framework for markets to
deliver maximum benefits for consumer welfare and productivity growth”.2
Competition Commissioner Aitken of the Canadian Competition Bureau noted,
“I do really think the two mandates address two sides of the same coin with the
ultimate goal of economic and consumer welfare”.3 At the Fourth Antitrust
Marathon, hosted by the Irish Competition Authority and executed by Professor
Spencer Waller and Dr Philip Marsden, the lead-off topic was the integration of
competition law and consumer protection. This paper theorises that topic.
A. INTRODUCTION
Competition law is traditionally conceived as regulation of the marketplace to
ensure private conduct does not suppress free trade and competition. It has as its
goal the preservation of competition. Competition serves to optimise consumers’
interests. Consumer protection regulation denotes a body of law designed to
protect a consumer’s interests at the level of the individual transaction. The two
fields share the same ultimate goal of protecting consumers.
But their approaches to achieving that goal differ. It may be possible to
conceive as the overriding distinction as one of market definition: consumer
protection regulation defines the market to be very small, limited to the
parameters of the individual transaction. That difference in approaches suggests
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it is possible that integration of a scheme designed to regulate markets nation- or
worldwide with a scheme designed to regulate atomistic transactions, which
consumer protection does, is neither realistic nor desirable. Likewise, protecting
consumers in individual transactions with a scheme designed to ensure
competition is preserved may miss the mark. This paper explores those
possibilities as well.
The integration of competition law and consumer protection has both
substantive and systemic components.4 The substantive question is whether
pursuing the end of consumer welfare optimisation through market regulation is
consistent with pursuing the same end through regulating transactions. The
systemic question is whether an agency or remedial scheme constituted to
advance competition policy can also serve the purpose of protecting individual
consumers or an agency or remedial scheme constituted to protect individual
consumers is consistent with the larger goal of preserving competition.
In Section B, I discuss the meaning of consumer harm. The prevention of
consumer harm is a goal of both competition law and consumer protection. What
consumer harm means is remarkably under-theorised. In Section C, I address the
following doctrinal and theoretical innovations and their place in the two fields.
First is the common use of deception rationales in consumer protection and
competition law enforcement. Second is the application of behavioural economics
in both consumer protection and competition law enforcement. Third is market
manipulation as a specific example of a hybrid competition/consumer protection
theory. Fourth and last is monopoly exploitation as a specific example of a hybrid
competition/consumer protection theory. I then turn in Section D to the topic of
enforcement systems. I inquire whether an agency created for competition law
enforcement is appropriately situated to engage in consumer protection work. I
also propose the possibility that private actions are better used in consumer
protection than in competition law.
B. THE ELUSIVE CONCEPT OF “CONSUMER HARM”
There is seemingly universal worldwide agreement that competition law and
consumer protection law both exist to protect consumers.5 What is the harm to
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4 See WE Kovacic, “The Federal Trade Commission at 100: Into our 2nd Century” (Federal Trade
Commission, 2009), 8 (“successful public policy outcomes are the product of good physics and
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www.ftc.gov/ftc/workshops/ftc100/docs/ftc100rpt.pdf (accessed on 2 February 2010).
5 Even the most efficiency-minded of US antitrust scholars adopt this view. See RA Bork, The
Antitrust Paradox 51 (New York, Free Press, 2nd edn, 1993) (“consumer welfare” is “the sole value”
underlying antitrust). It has worldwide acceptance as well. See OECD, “Report on the Seventh
Global Forum on Competition” (2008), 8 (concluding that competition law exists to protect
consumers).
be prevented or remedied remains poorly understood.6 Consumer harm in
competition law may differ from consumer harm in the field of consumer
protection.7 It is also necessary to ask what is meant by “consumer”, and whether
it is the same thing between competition and consumer protection law.
1. Consumer Protection
In the consumer protection field, harm is comparatively easy to define. It is a
break-down in an individual consumer transaction. The failure usually occurs at
the origination stage. But as, for example, in the cases of laws regulating usury or
common-law doctrines such as unconscionability, consumer harm can occur in
the substance of the transaction. The failures with which consumer law is
concerned undermine the consumer’s ability to optimise his or her own welfare.
Consumer law targets those failings to grant individual consumers remedies. It
thus fills gaps that market forces leave unfilled.
In the US system, at least, the “consumer” in consumer protection law usually
is easy to define: it is the individual, end-user consumer.8 Many US federal
consumer protection statutes limit their application to transactions involving
individuals where the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family,
or household purposes.9 That meaning may be universal: the OFT describes
“[c]onsumer policy . . . as focusing on how firms interact with [individual retail]
consumers, on trading practices and contract terms”.10
The Federal Trade Commission Act is not so limited. It applies to unfair or
deceptive trade practices generally without regard to the victim of those
practices.11 But theories of deception and unfairness often turn on disparities in
sophistication between the parties, suggesting the individual consumer is the
better victim.12
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10 OFT, supra n 2, para 2.4; see also ibid, para 2.3 (defining “consumer” as “individual retail
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11 See 15 USC § 45.
12 See, eg Charles of the Ritz Distrib Corp v FTC, 143 F2d 676 (2d Cir 1944) (FTC Act “not made for the
protection of experts, but for the public”, including “the average woman, conditioned by talk in
magazines and over the radio”). It is also the case that consumer protection is a populist
2. Competition Law
Defining consumer harm is much more difficult in competition law. The
consumer harm in US competition law generally is phrased in terms of
decreased output and increased prices.13 The dictum that competition law should
be primarily concerned with consumer welfare is more fully understood to mean
competition law seeks to prevent harm to competition, and consumer welfare will
be thereby maximised.14
Such an approach has the tendency to undermine any direct intervention on
behalf of individual consumers. If an individual transaction produces a
sub-optimal result, competition law assumes the marketplace will supply the
resolution.15 The incapable or shady merchant will be replaced by one who
serves consumers’ wishes and does so fairly. Across the mass of consumers, then,
welfare may be optimised. The handful of consumers left unsatisfied before the
losing producer exited the market are too few to bring down the average. Those
few do not reflect “harm to competition”.16
The definition of “consumer antitrust” remains under-theorised.17 That is a
remarkable reality, given the frequency with which consumer welfare is invoked
to justify a particular decision or policy prescription.18 There remains a vigorous
debate whether consumers benefit when economic efficiency is maximised, and
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endeavour, and protecting individual end-users makes for a better press release than does
protecting a commercial enterprise.
13 Mr Averitt and Professor Lande prefer a standard based on “consumer choice”, both in terms of
price and non-price characteristics. NW Averitt and R Lande, “Using the Consumer Choice
Approach to Antitrust Law” (2005) 74 Antitrust Law Journal 175, 179.
14 See Fishman v Estate of Wirtz, 807 F2d 520, 536 (7th Cir 1986) (“The antitrust laws are concerned
with the competitive process . . . A healthy and unimpaired competitive process is presumed to be
in the consumer interest”); FH Easterbrook, “When is it Worthwhile to use Courts to Search for
Exclusionary Conduct?” [2003] Columbia Business Law Review 345, 347; G Monti, remarks at the
Fourth Antitrust Marathon (27 October 2009), Tr 33–34 (noting that competition law protects
competition, not consumers as such, and citing the Whole Foods merger for the proposition that
an emphasis on consumer protection risks over-enforcement).
15 OFT, supra n 2, para 2.3.
16 Professor Crane differentiates between wealth transfers from individual consumers to producers,
which is “not necessarily inefficient in an economic sense”, and “deadweight losses”, which are
“the primary social costs of anticompetitive behavior”. DA Crane, “Optimizing Private Antitrust
Enforcement” [2010] Vanderbilt Law Review (forthcoming), draft, 7, available at ssrn.com/
abstract=1474956.
17 That is so not just in the US. See P Marsden and P Whelan, “Consumer Detriment and its
Application in EC and UK Competition Law” (2006) 10 European Competition Law Review 569, 572
(“given that one of the fundamental objectives of EC competition law relates to the maximization
of consumer welfare”, it is “undeniably odd that neither consumer benefit nor consumer
detriment have been given comprehensive treatment”).
18 Thoughtful recent work of Professor Lande, Professor Kirkwood and Neil Averitt makes efforts to
remedy this limitation. See JB Kirkwood and R Lande, “The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust:
Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency” (2008) 84 Notre Dame Law Review 181; NW
Averitt and R Lande, “Using the Consumer Choice Approach to Antitrust Law” (2005) 74
Antitrust Law Journal 175.
who gets the surplus is unimportant, or competition law requires that consumers
rather than producers benefit from surplus welfare.19
Averitt and Lande’s “consumer choice” paradigm harmonises competition
law and consumer protection. Competition law, by protecting competition,
ensures consumers have options available to them. Consumer protection ensures
that “consumers are able to make a reasonably free and rational selection from
among those options”.20 That elegant resolution suggests that antitrust and
consumer protection are complementary so long as consumer protection targets
the origination phase of the consumer transaction, dealing with theories of
deception and their close cousin, disclosure regulation. Averitt and Lande’s
paradigm does not hold where consumer protection regulation targets
substantive transaction terms, because those terms limit, rather than enhance,
consumer choice.
C. DOCTRINAL AND THEORETICAL INNOVATIONS
In this section I discuss four legal innovations and their place in antitrust and
consumer protection, respectively. First is the common use of deception
rationales in consumer protection and competition law enforcement. Second is
the application of behavioural economics in both consumer protection and
competition law enforcement. Third is market manipulation as a specific
example of a hybrid competition/consumer protection theory. Fourth and last is
monopoly exploitation as a specific example of a hybrid competition/consumer
protection theory.
1. Deception
Deception is the quintessential consumer harm.21 Deception operates at the
origination phase of a consumer transaction. It limits consumers’ abilities fully
and fairly to negotiate the terms of the transaction and causes them to enter into
transactions they would otherwise eschew. Deception thus strikes at the
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producers are willing to accept for each unit of output). Much business conduct can be explained
by producers’ efforts to co-opt for themselves as much of the surplus as possible.
20 Averitt and Lande, supra n 18, 181. Cf OFT, supra n 2, para 3.3 (OFT’s interventions “safeguard
the choices available to customers”. Consumer protection “promot[es] ‘clean’ conditions in which
customers can exercise choice . . . ”).
21 Cf MM Greenfield, Consumer Transactions (Gaithersburg, MD, Aspen, 5th edn, 2009) (describing
early consumer law as a reaction to failings in a system based on freedom of contract and caveat
emptor).
foundation of the freedom of contract and welfare optimisation through free
choice. Harm exists even where the transaction is otherwise “fair” to the
consumer.
According to Professor Stucke, circumstances may exist in which deception
also is competitive harm.22 He argues that profit-maximising firms would only
engage in deception if the expected benefits, in the form of monopoly profits,
outweighed the expected costs, which include the costs of the deceitful
advertising, the criminal and civil liability that may attend, and the “potential
loss of sales, goodwill, and competitive advantage if the deceit is uncovered”.23
He proposes that a prima facie case of a violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act should be established by proof that a monopolist engaged in deceitful
conduct which is reasonably capable of creating or maintaining monopoly
power.24
It is not difficult to see how, in theory, deception can harm the marketplace as
well as the individual consumer. Market forces operate on the basis of
consumers’ revealed preferences. Where consumer decisions are made on the
basis of material misinformation, consumer contracting decisions do not reveal
consumer preferences in any real sense. The very harm that gives rise to liability
under consumer protection theories also presents a possible competitive concern.
Moreover, economists have proved that deception will exist in some optimal
amount whenever one of two conditions holds. Either there must be a strong
belief that the deception will not be exposed, or the firm must not be concerned
about repeat business.25 A monopoly or near-monopoly marketplace satisfies
both conditions. Consumers have no alternatives, so must return to the
monopoly producer if they want to make a purchase. And the chance of
deception being exposed is minimised because there are no competitors available
to do the exposing.26 That suggests that monopoly maintenance through
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22 See ME Stucke, “How Do (and Should) Competition Authorities Treat a Dominant Firm’s
Deception?”, University of Tennessee College of Law Research Paper No 57 (2009), available at
ssrn.com/abstract=1397728 (accessed on 2 February 2010).
23 Stucke, ibid, 13. In support of Stucke’s arguments, the concerns of loss of sales, goodwill and
competitive advantage seem small in comparison to the advantages to be gained from fraud and
deceit. Importantly, the benefit from deceit is borne entirely by the single deceitful actor. The
harm is spread across the entire industry. Cf Kovacic, supra n 1, 114–15 (“False advertising and
deceptive marketing practices can damage the capacity of honest merchants to attract
consumers . . . ”).
24 Stucke, supra n 22, 42.
25 See MR Darby and E Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud (1973) 16 Journal of Law
& Economics 67, 69–71, 74–75, 77; R Posner, Regulation of Advertising by the FTC (Washington, AEI
1973), 5.
26 Stucke argues that deception cannot succeed in a perfectly competitive marketplace. Stucke, supra
n 21, 2 (“Deception does not occur in a perfectly competitive market . . .”). Darby and Karni
demonstrate otherwise. Producers in a perfectly competitive market are indifferent as to whether
the consumer returns, satisfying one of the conditions for some amount of fraud being optimal.
See Darby and Karni, supra n 25, 77 (“In the strictest competitive framework for the model, the
present value of future relationship with the customer would be zero, since there is no reason for
deception is realistic and rational. It should therefore offer a basis for an abuse of
dominance liability.
Deception might also present a theory of harm in oligopoly industries. Firms
in an industry marked by few participants and with homogenous goods (or
homogeneous characteristics of differentiated goods) might find it advantageous
not to expose their competitors’ deception, but instead to imitate it.27 A ready
example of this is the parallel failure of cigarette manufacturers to expose the
harm caused by rivals’ products.28 Jurisdictions that pursue theories of harm
through tacit collusion might consider tacitly collusive deception as a form of
illegal coordinated conduct. Tacitly collusive deception is certainly not, or likely
to become, a theory of harm in the US system.29
Recent mainstream antitrust thinking in the United States has tended to
assume deception cannot have real market effects.30 It appears that the EC
shares this general view in its enforcement of Article 82 of the EC Treaty. In the
2 September 2009 Guidance paper on enforcement priorities, deception by a
dominant firm was not discussed as a specific form of abusive conduct.31 The
Canadian Competition Bureau’s draft updated enforcement guidelines for abuse
of dominance, interpreting sections 78 and 79 of the Competition Act, likewise
fail to mention deception as impermissible conduct.32 However, “misleading
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Pleading Elements in Private Antitrust Conspiracy Claims” (2008) 10 University of Pennsylvania
Journal of Business and Employment Law 627, 646.
28 Janger and Block-Lieb give the example of two “lemons equilibria” in consumer lending, where,
despite competition, lenders engage in “price concealment” and the enforcing of “default rates,
late fees and penalties” that are “both non-transparent and designed to capitalize on consumer
heuristic biases”. Janger and Block-Lieb, supra n 26, 71.
29 The US Supreme Court reaffirmed US courts’ resolve to prohibit tacit collusion as an
enforcement theory in Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544 (2007).
30 See H Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law (New York, Aspen, 3rd edn, 2006), vol IIIB, para 782d
(deceptive disparagement of a rival has a de minimis competitive impact).
31 EC, “Communication from the Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement
Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant
Undertakings” (2 September 2009), 13–26, available at www.hartpub.co.uk/updates/korah/
abusiveexclusionaryconduct.pdf. However, the Guidance paper does not purport to address all the
circumstances in which Art 82 may be applied. See ibid, 5 (noting that exploitation of monopoly
power, “for example charging excessively high prices”, may infringe Art 82, but is not discussed in
the Guidance paper).
32 See Canadian Competition Bureau, “Draft for Public Consultation, Updated Enforcement
Guidelines, The Abuse of Dominance Provisions (Sections 78 and 79 of the Competition
Act)” (January 2009), i, available at http://competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/
Draft-Abuse-of-Dominance-Guidelines-eng-16012009.pdf (accessed on 2 February 2010).
advertising” is a violation of Canada’s Competition Act punishable by up to $15
million fines, suggesting that deception theories have some validity in Canada.33
2. Behavioural Exploitation
Behavioural economics has a natural place in consumer protection regulation.
According to Professor Greenfield, “behavioral economics teaches that
consumers are not necessarily rational actors and that sellers may structure
transactions in such a way as to take advantage of this lack of rationality”.34
There is a deep body of literature, in both the popular35 and the academic36
presses, expanding on that reality. According to Cavendish Elithorn, commenting
on an earlier draft of this paper at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon, “[q]uite a lot
of behavioural economics is . . . what marketers have known and used for years”.37
The Bureau of Economics at the US Federal Trade Commission has
recognised this reality. It held a conference on behavioural economics and
consumer policy in 2007.38 At that conference, papers demonstrating consumer
decision-making biases and merchants’ abilities to exploit those biases were
presented and critiqued.39 The agency currently is undertaking “two exploratory
studies on consumer susceptibility to fraudulent and deceptive marketing”.40 The
studies will concentrate on “several decision-making biases . . . that can cause
inaccurate assessments of the risks, costs, and benefits of various choices”.41 As
of now, however, how exactly to incorporate behaviouralist principles into a
coherent enforcement regime remains under-studied.
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33 See Y Beriault, OJ Borgers, DB Houston, RT Hughes, M Renaud and RW Pawluk,
“Government Enacts Significant Changes to Canada’s Competition Laws” (17 September 2009),
available at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=85924 (accessed on 2 February 2010).
34 Greenfield, supra n 21, 1.
35 See, eg RB Cialdini, Infuence: The Psychology of Persuasion (New York, Harper Collins, revised edn,
2007).
36 See, eg C Jolls, CR Sunstein and R Thaler, “A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics”
(1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 1471; M Stucke, “Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in
the Twenty-First Century” (2007) 38 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 513, 527–32 (citing
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37 C Elithorn, remarks at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon (27 October 2009), infra p 29. See also
Cialdini, supra n 35, xii (arguing that marketers, or “compliance professionals”, are adept at
influencing consumer decisions using techniques that meet this author’s definition of behavioral
exploitation).
38 See http://www.ftc.gov/be/consumerbehavior/index.shtml (accessed on 2 February 2010).
39 See, eg D Karlan in Session B: Information, Persuasion, and Deception: Marketing Techniques
and their Impact on Consumer Choice, FTC Conference on Behavioral Economics and
Consumer Policy (20 April 2007), 1–17, available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/consumerbehavior/
docs/transcript/transcriptb.pdf. Professor Karlan presented a paper demonstrating that non-
substantive marketing practices, such as the inclusion of a photograph of an attractive woman in
an unsolicited offering of consumer loan products, had enormous impacts on the prices consumers
were willing to pay for the products. See ibid, 13–14.
40 Fed Reg, Vol 74, No 111, 27794 (11 June 2009).
41 Ibid, 27795; see also Fed Reg, Vol 74, No 111, 27796, 27797 (11 June 2009).
Although the Federal Trade Commission has begun to study the theories, it
has not so far articulated an approach to consumer protection that protects
consumers from their own irrational behaviour.42 Overtones of behaviouralist
theories can be found in semi-subjective standards for deception, based on the
“reasonable consumer” test (which implies a lack of sophistication)43 or in
especially protective legislation targeted at college students.44 Disclosure
requirements also may be predicated on concerns for exploitation. For example,
regulations requiring that warnings be highlighted or be particularly vivid45
might be linked to known tendencies to consumer optimism or seek themselves
to exploit the so-called “vividness” bias. The Federal Trade Commission’s
consumer education efforts may also be explained in part by a desire to
overcome consumers’ decision-making biases in individual transactions.
By contrast, behaviouralist theories are slow to catch on in the analysis of
competition law.46 Neither of the US agencies has incorporated behaviouralism
into their enforcement paradigms.47 Professors Maurice Stucke and Avishalom
Tor are two of the few to have analysed the role of behavioural economics in
competition policy. According to Stucke, assumptions of rational conduct by
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42 The FTC’s consumer education efforts serve this purpose in part. See http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/
consumer/shtm.
43 See, eg Charles of the Ritz, supra n 12; In re Arthur Murray Studio of Washington, Inc, 78 FTC 401 (1971).
44 See, eg the Credit CARD Act of 2009, Public L No 111–24, 123 Stat 1734.
45 See, eg Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 USC §§ 1331–41 (stating disclosure
requirements for cigarette manufacturers).
46 It may be possible to conceive of all conduct presenting competitive harms as deceptive or
behaviourally exploitative in nature. The definition of most abusive dominant firm conduct
assumes net consumer harm over the period of anticompetitive conduct and subsequent
recoupment. Repeat player consumers acting rationally would not make purchasing decisions that
would cause them greater expense over the long run. If consumers do act rationally, purchasing
decisions that cause them net harm can be explained either by their being deceived or by
information asymmetries that reflect omissions (deceptive under certain circumstances) by the
producers. Consumers acting irrationally, based perhaps on optimism about future events or
hyperbolic discounting of future costs, can be led into purchasing decisions that are more costly in
the long term.
47 In May 2009, in response to a question by this author, US Assistant Attorney General Christine
Varney punted the question whether behaviouralism might play a role in a retooled enforcement
methodology. See CA Varney, question-and-answer following “Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement
in this Challenging Era”, remarks before the US Chamber of Commerce (12 May 2009), remarks
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.htm. The following day Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Carl Shapiro, the agency’s chief economist, affirmatively disavowed
behavioural economics as an important investigation and enforcement tool. See C Shapiro,
“Competition Policy in Distressed Industries”, remarks at the ABA Antitrust Symposium:
Competition as Public Policy (13 May 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
speeches/245857.htm (accessed on 2 February 2010). FTC Commissioner J Thomas Rosch is
more receptive to behaviouralist theories, as his remarks and one dissenting opinion suggest. See
JT Rosch, “Antitrust Law Enforcement: What to do About the Current Economics Cacophony?”,
remarks at the Bates White Antitrust Conference 2 (1 June 2009); cf FTC v Ovation Pharm, Inc, FTC
File No 810156 (Concurring Statement of Commissioner Rosch) (arguing that removal of
reputational constraints that previously prevented the exercise of monopoly power might
implicate Clayton Act, s 7).
firms do not hold across the range of behaviour by firms. “It appears anecdotally
that corporate behavior is (or is not) occurring that is not readily explainable
under antitrust’s rational choice theories.”48 Stucke and Tor’s supply-side
behavioural question has the potential to undermine decisions like that of the
US Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, which relied on assumptions of
rational conduct by firms to conclude that failing to enter into competition after
the deregulation of the US telephone markets was most likely based on
unilateral decisions rather than conspiracy. 49
The demand-side question is a different matter. Behavioural economics
teaches that consumers are not always rational. The Office of Fair Trading
recently has recognised that remedies may be crafted with an eye toward realities
of consumer behaviour imported from the study of consumer protection. For
example, while consumer choice is believed to be good, behavioural economics
teaches too much choice leads to sub-optimal results.50
In “Money, is that What I Want?”, Stucke questions the assumptions of
rational choice on the part of consumers.51 He stops short of prescribing a
theory of competitive harm based on “behavioural exploitation”—which I
define to be a merchant’s exploiting known biases in consumer decision-making.
A theory of competitive harm through behavioural exploitation might
approximate the theory of competitive harm through deception discussed in
Section C.1 supra. By exploiting known biases in consumer decision-making, a
monopolist can maintain, or perhaps even attain, monopoly power, just as it does
through deceptive conduct. The same harm—causing inefficient resource
allocation—that deception threatens arises in the context of behavioural exploi-
tation as well. Consumers who are induced to make purchases on the basis of
decision-making biases are not optimising their welfare.
In concrete terms, behavioural exploitation includes such behaviour as
structuring default choices to induce consumers to make decisions favouring the
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48 Stucke, supra n 36, 517. See also A Tor, “A Behavioral Approach to Antitrust Law and
Economics” (2004) 14 Consumer Policy Review 2.
49 550 US 544 (2007). Cf A Tor, “The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline and
Legal Policy” (2002) 101 Michigan Law Review 482 (concluding that behavioural economics teaches
the traditional understanding of firms’ entry decisions is wrong).
50 Office of Fair Trading, supra n 2, para 3.9. See also the remarks of Cavendish Elithorn at the
Fourth Antitrust Marathon (27 October 2009), infra p 29 (“The OFT does believe behavioural
economics is a really important lens through which to look at detriment and one which has an
impact on elements like the choice question. We do believe in PQRS, price, quality, range and
service as part of the overall welfare in our merger decisions and in our general approach.
However we also note that in some cases excessive choice can lead to less consumer activation in
the markets and that is a source of detriment”).
51 ME Stucke, “Money, Is that What I Want? Competition Policy and the Role of Behavioral
Economics”, University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No 75 (forthcoming 2010; to
be published in vol 50 of the Santa Clara Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1419751 (accessed on 2 February 2010).
merchant, not the consumer.52 Other biases that can be exploited by savvy
merchants include over-optimism;53 the tendency to judge choices by their
relative, rather than absolute, merit;54 the tendency to believe exciting or
fearsome (salient) phenomena, which are easy to call to mind, are more common
than actually they are;55 and the tendency to anchor decisions to arbitrary
values.56
A good recent example of behavioural exploitation in the US economy is the
sale of lending products to consumers in the years leading up to the collapse of
the housing bubble.57 Consumers’ agreeing to teaser-rate mortgages can be
explained by decision-making biases such as irrational tendencies to over-
optimism,58 which would cause borrowers to believe they will be able to pay the
mortgage or sell the house once the rate adjusts. In another paper discussed at
the Fourth Antitrust Marathon, Professors Janger and Block-Lieb explain the
phenomenon in terms of “cognitive limitations”, “heuristic biases, such as
optimism and endowment effects”, and “time-inconsistent preferences, some-
times referred to as hyperbolic discounting”.59
How behavioural exploitation presents a competitive, rather than merely a
consumer, harm is more difficult to explain. The behavioural exploitation theory
of abuse of dominance suffers the same difficulties as does the deception theory.
It is difficult to demonstrate the competitive harm, rather than harm to one
consumer,  flowing  from  a  course  of behavioural  exploitation.  But  the  same
rationale supporting deception as a competitive harm should apply to
behavioural exploitation, perhaps even with more force. The market impacts of
falsely revealed preferences must produce allocative inefficiencies as resources
flow to uses that reflect consumers’ apparent, rather than actual, preferences.
Unlike deception, behavioural exploitation is difficult to uncover, and therefore
may produce longer-lasting consumer harm.60
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52 It is exceedingly difficult to draw the line between vigorous and desirable marketing practices and
“behavioural exploitation”.
53 C Jolls, CR Sunstein and R Thaler, “A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics” in CR
Sunstein (ed), Behavioral Law and Economics (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 13, 47.
54 See D Ariely, Predictably Irrational (New York, Harper Collins, 2008), 1–21 (citing, inter alia, A
Tversky and D Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice” (1981)
211(4481) Science 453).
55 A Aviram, “The Placebo Effect of the Law” (2006) 75 George Washington Law Review 54, 73
(referring to salience as the “vividness bias”).
56 Ariely, supra n 54, 23–48 (citing, inter alia, CR Sunstein, D Kahneman, D Schkade and I Ritov,
“Predictably Incoherent Judgments” (2002) 54 Stanford Law Review 1153).
57 See Janger and Block-Lieb, supra n 26, 70.
58 See Jolls et al, supra n 36.
59 Janger and Block-Lieb, supra n 26.
60 Economist Pat Massey noted another concern with a behavioural exploitation theory of
enforcement. “Regulatory agencies have an inbuilt incentive to continuously expand their
activities so if you start down the road of saying we have to protect consumers from themselves
agencies will find great scope to dream up all sorts of imaginative ways of doing that and
expanding their own empires.” P Massey, remarks at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon (27 October
2009), infra p 45.
Thus, as with deception, two criteria for some amount of behavioural exploi-
tation being rational are a lack of expectation of repeat player business and a
low risk of detection.61 A monopoly marketplace satisfies both criteria, with no
competitors to expose the behavioural exploitation and no other options
available to consumers. Monopoly maintenance through behavioural exploi-
tation seems likely to be successful. Acquiring a monopoly through behavioural
exploitation is less likely to succeed.62 More so even than with deception,
competitors are the most likely exposers of exploitation.63 Also, if exploitation is
exposed and counteracted, consumers have competitive options for their
purchasing decisions.
3. Market Manipulation
One recent example of agency law-making in the US is worth studying as an
example of combined competition law and consumer protection theories. On 4
November 2009, an FTC rule dealing with market manipulation in the
petroleum industry became effective. Promulgated under the authority of the
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007,64 the rule “prohibits fraudulent
or deceptive conduct that could harm wholesale petroleum markets”.65
Market manipulation as a theory of competitive harm is sufficiently unique in
the US system that this approach required the first antitrust rulemaking in US
history.66 The description of the rule and its purposes reads much more like
classic consumer protection doctrine. The FTC is concerned with “fraud”,
“deceit” and “omissions of material information”.67 But, unlike classic consumer
protection doctrine, which Section B shows is concerned with individual
end-user consumers, the market manipulation rule is concerned only with harms
in the wholesale marketplace.68 Concerns for harm at wholesale rather than
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61 Cf Darby and Karni, supra n 25.
62 Monopoly acquisition has recently been argued to be an enforcement backwater both in the US,
where it technically can be challenged, and in the EU, where “a nondominant firm may obtain
dominance through unilateral anticompetitive conduct without risking violating European
competition law”. A Tor, “Unilateral, Anticompetitive Acquisitions of Dominance or Monopoly
Power” (2010), 2–3, available at ssrn.com/abstract=1531745.
63 Competitors will be educated in the same marketing techniques and will be able to recognise
exploitative conduct engaged in by their competition.
64 42 USC §§ 17301–17305.
65 FTC press release, “New FTC Rule Prohibits Petroleum Market Manipulation”, 6 August 2009,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/08/mmr.shtm (accessed on 2 February 2010). The
rule is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/08/P082900mmr_finalrule.pdf (accessed on 2
February 2010).
66 But see CS Hemphill, “An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to
Preserve Drug Competition” (2009) 109 Columbia Law Review 629, 644, note 68.
67 Supra n 65.
68 See Guide to Complying with Petroleum Market Manipulation Regulations 1, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oilgas/rules.htm (“EISA and the Petroleum Market Manipulation Rule do
not apply to retail sales of gasoline, diesel, or fuel oil”). The Compliance Guide also differentiates
retail are reminiscent of theories of competitive, not consumer, harm.69 In fact,
in antitrust suits by purchasers under the US antitrust laws, harm is only
cognisable in the wholesale marketplace.70
The theoretical allocative inefficiency from market manipulation is clear
enough. A strategy of creating and maintaining dominance in the market might
include falsely reporting prices in wholesale transactions. False price reports may
impact new entrants’ decisions whether to devote resources to entry.71 Such false
reporting, if effective in excluding competitors, would present a clear competitive
harm.
False reporting of prices will be successful only if not counteracted by
competitors. A producer with de minimis market power will have no ability to
influence competitive entry decisions through price reporting. By contrast,
producers in an oligopoly marketplace may tacitly collude in false price
reporting, and a monopoly producer will be able to control price reports through
its unilateral conduct.
Harm to consumers can occur where prices are pegged to a benchmark and
the manipulation serves to impact that benchmark in the seller’s favour.72 But
because the rule operates in the wholesale marketplace, some form of pass-
through would be required to produce an effect on individual end-user
consumers.
4. Monopoly Exploitation
The US system has traditionally viewed abuse of properly acquired monopoly
power as not presenting a competition law concern,73 although it may implicate
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between conduct in bilateral negotiations, which are “unlikely to affect the integrity of the
market”, and “widely disseminated” false statements or omissions, which have market-wide
consequences. The former are not intended to be covered by the prohibition on manipulation,
while the latter are. See ibid, 3, 10.
69 See OFT, supra n 2, para 2.3 (differentiating “individual retail consumers” from “large players,
both upstream and downstream”).
70 Cf Illinois Brick Co v Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977) (indirect purchasers not entitled to sue under US
antitrust laws).
71 Cf E Romstad, “The Informational Role of Prices” (2008) 35 European Review of Agricultural
Economics 263. Antitrust caselaw recognises the role of prices in inducing competitive entry. See, eg
Kiefer-Stewart Co v Joseph E Seagram & Sons, 340 US 211 (1951) (holding horizontal maximum price
fixing to be per se illegal; holding has been supported because the maximum price fixing has the
capacity to preclude competitive entry).
72 See In re CMS Mktg Servs & Trading Co, Comm Fut L Rep (CCH) ¶ 29,634 (CFTC, 25 November
2003) (the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, acting under its own market manipulation
rule, finding liability for the submission of false information to private reporting services).
73 Although the dominant theoretical basis for antitrust enforcement in the US does not cognise
exploitation as grounds for a remedy, there are historical examples of similar theories succeeding.
See, eg United States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, 310 US 150 (1940) (manipulating prices in gasoline
markets by buying up distress inventory at the “fair going market price” held per se illegal).
consumer protection issues if it violates a particular prohibition.74 For example,
some US states prohibit “price gouging”, defined (under one representative law)
as selling or leasing essential commodities or shelter at an excessive mark-up over
the average price prior to the emergency.75 The US approach is shared by the
Canadian Competition Bureau. In the January 2009 Draft Abuse of Dominance
Updates, the Competition Bureau notes that abuse of dominance is a concern
where the abuse “has had, is having, or is likely to have the effect of substantially
preventing or lessening competition . . . [H]igh prices do not in themselves raise
issues under the Act”.76
Charging excessively high prices is the most obvious example of such a
monopoly abuse. Standard microeconomic theory proposes that charging high
prices is what incentivises new entry, so is likely to bring about the downfall of
the monopolists’ position.77
The EC has announced that such “directly exploitative” conduct may infringe
Article 82, prompting Commission intervention “in particular where the
protection of consumers and the proper functioning of the internal market
cannot otherwise be adequately assured”.78 Examples exist of prosecutions for
monopoly exploitation in the EU.79
The proper role of exploitative abuse enforcement in a competition law
scheme is unclear. Correcting for abuses permitted by asymmetries in bargaining
power favouring producers is a natural extension of contract law “overreaching”
doctrines, such as duress and unconscionability, and as such may be properly the
subject of a consumer protection framework. However, such abuses can be
invitations to competitive entry. Correcting for those abuses may entrench the
power of a monopolist, rather than increase competition.80 And Commissioner
Kovacic has suggested that “controls on abusive behavior by dominant
enterprises’ may “inevitably become mechanisms by which frail and politically
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74 See H Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise (Harvard University Press, 2005), 108–09 (“Firms . . .
determine their own output and set prices . . . None of this behavior is even presumptively
suspicious”).
75 See, eg Florida Statutes 501.160.
76 Draft Updates, supra n 32, i (Executive Summary). See also M Aitken, remarks at the Fourth
Antitrust Marathon (27 October 2009), infra p 38.
77 See FH Easterbrook, “Monopoly, Manipulation and the Regulation of Futures Markets” (1986)
59 Journal of Business S103, S105.
78 Communication from the Commission, supra n 31, 5. An example of this might be found in the
investigation of a supplier in the German electricity market. See European Commission, “Report
on Competition Policy 2008” (23 July 2009), paras 49–50. E.ON AG was thought to have “abused
its dominant market position . . . by strategically withholding production capacity of certain power
plants on the wholesale market in order to drive up the price”.
79 See, eg Case C-323/93 Societe Civile Agricole du Centre d”Insemination de la Crespelle v Cooperative
d”Elevage et d”Insemination Artificielle du Departement de la Mayenne [1994] ECR I-5077, I-5106.
80 It is all the more a concern that the monopolist whose power is entrenched has proved itself to be
an unlikable character.
buffeted competition agencies reestablish the type of state orchestration of the
economy that market reforms were designed to eliminate”.81
D. ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS
The systemic question is whether an agency constituted to advance competition
policy can also serve the purpose of protecting individual consumers. It is
possible consumer protection enforcement is best placed in the hands of private
litigants. It is logical to question whether public enforcement of consumer
protection laws, or consumer-protection-like behavioural exploitation, market
manipulation or monopoly exploitation claims under a competition framework
fails the test of comparative advantage. Such enforcement may rely on the
particulars of individual consumers’ circumstances in a way that favours private
enforcement over public. By contrast, some have questioned the capacity of
private litigants to remedy harms felt across the marketplace, rather than in
individual transactions.
1. Agency Structure
A plurality of national competition agencies are combined with their consumer
protection watchdogs.82 In the US, the Federal Trade Commission83 and many
state enforcement agencies are so structured. The Canadian Competition Bureau
and Competition Tribunal combine competition law and consumer protection
enforcement mandates.84 That is the chosen structure for the UK Office of Fair
Trading85 and, as of recently, the Irish Competition Authority.86 DG Com-
petition has created a “dedicated Consumer Liaison unit”.87 According to the
OFT, “[f]rom a recent ‘back of the envelope’ check on 37 other countries, we see
that about one third of them also have agencies in which competition and
consumer functions are combined”.88 If enforcement systems compete just as to
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81 Kovacic, supra n 1, 103. Cf the remarks of Bill Prasifka at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon (27
October 2009), infra p 38 (noting concerns for regulatory capture in consumer protection
enforcement).
82 See Federal Trade Commission, “Competition and Consumer Protection Authorities
Worldwide”, available at http://www.ftc.gov/oia/authorities.shtm (accessed on 2 February 2010).
83 See TJ Muris, “More than Enforcement: The FTC’s Many Tools—A Conversation with Tim
Muris and Bob Pitofsky” (2005) 72 Antitrust Law Journal 773, 780–81 (former chairman Robert
Pitofsky noting that the FTC’s twin enforcement regimes share the overriding mission of
improving consumer welfare.)
84 http://competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/home (accessed on 2 February 2010).
85 http://www.oft.gov.uk/ (accessed on 2 February 2010).
86 See P Gorecki, remarks at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon (27 October 2009), infra p 34.
87 EC, supra n 30, para 109, 27. See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/liaison_en.html
(accessed on 2 February 2010).
88 OFT, supra n 2, para 4.1 (citing specifically the US, Canada and Australia).
participants in the commercial marketplace, the success of the dual-responsibility
agency seems apparent.
It is harder to explain why an agency with a divided mission should be
preferable to one with a single purpose.89 Commissioner Kovacic has written:
“The Commission’s capacity to meld expertise in economics, competition, and
consumer protection is a conscious element of its institutional design and a
major reason for its existence”.90 Efficiencies do clearly exist in consolidated
management, and the Bureau of Economics serves the enforcement efforts of
both legal bureaus. And the market manipulation rule (Section C.3, supra)
appears to provide an example of cooperative efforts between the competition
lawyers and consumer protection lawyers at the agency.91 The Canadian
experience with efficiencies and occasional coordinated enforcement efforts is
similar.92
On the other hand, anecdotal hearsay evidence suggests that at the Federal
Trade Commission, the Bureaus of Competition and Consumer Protection
rarely coordinate enforcement efforts.93 Commissioner Aitken recognised the
tensions and managerial challenges inherent in the realities of easy wins in small
cases for consumer protection contrasted with the esoteric theories and difficult
litigation in larger cases for competition law.94
The OFT recognises the limited gains from ostensible integration.95 “Until
recently[, its] competition and consumer enforcement work sat within two
separate divisions—in effect two silos with their own legal and intellectual worlds
which had little to do with each other.”96 But the OFT is optimistic about the
possibilities for further integration going forward.97
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89 Perhaps supporting this assertion, Paul Gorecki noted in comments at the Fourth Antitrust
Marathon that Ireland chose an administrative structure which separated competition
enforcement from consumer protection, but later combined them in a “shotgun marriage”, with
“no study”, and “mainly for budgetary reasons” (infra pp 33–34).
90 Kovacic, supra n 4, v (Introduction).
91 See “Report of the Federal Trade Commission on Activities in the Oil and Natural Gas Indus-
tries” (January–June 2009), 3, available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oilgas/competn_reports.htm
(accessed on 29 December 2009).
92 See M Aitken, remarks at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon (27 October 2009), infra pp 31, 32
(noting “efficiencies in management” and a “relatively rare occasion” of “collaborative work
across the two missions”).
93 This appears to reflect the reality (if not the aspiration) for other agencies as well. In Canada, “it is
probably undeniable that the actual shared work, this notion that you would integrate the
perspectives into a particular case comes up from time to time but not very often”. M Aitken,
remarks at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon (27 October 2009), infra p 32.
94 M Aitken, remarks at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon (27 October 2009), Tr 18–19 (noting the
populist effect of consumer protection but the lack of a “big bang” for each enforcement dollar
“leaving aside the media”).
95 OFT, supra n 2, ¶ 4.2.
96 OFT, supra n 2, ¶ 4.2.
97 See C Elithorn, remarks at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon (27 October 2009), infra p 28 (“I
certainly feel the OFT does have a single purpose; its mission is to make markets work well for
consumers so I wouldn’t recognise that divide in a way that I think sometimes the debate tries to
force upon the OFT”).
Similar to the FTC bureaus’ combined efforts in market manipulation,
producing a rule that is susceptible to characterisation as both competition law
and consumer protection (see Section C.3, supra), OFT recognises that “[w]hat
begins as a competition issue may turn out to be more susceptible to consumer
remedies, and vice versa”.98 Commissioner Aitken noted a particular example of
a merger review in which “[w]e had our fair business folks, our consumer
protection folks looking at it, our abuse of dominance folks looking at the conduct
as well and then of course our merger folks looking at the merger”. That was, in
her view, an example of a successful coordinated cross-agency effort.99 None of
the commenters at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon nor the OFT in its December
2009 White Paper on integration explained what result would obtain where an
irreconcilable tension arose between enforcers focused on competition policy and
those focused on consumer protection.100
As one example of its integrated enforcement efforts, the OFT describes a
process of market studies in recent years and currently, studying both supply-side
and demand-side characteristics of a particular industry. Maurice Stucke
recently has proposed just such an approach to innovative enforcement for the
US system.101 It is possible intra-agency cooperation is more realistic at the level
of market-wide regulatory efforts, like those described by the OFT in its White
Paper or recommended by Stucke, in contrast with casework in a specific investi-
gation. An exception might be made for merger investigations like that described
by Commissioner Aitken, which, with the structural remedies at issue, is more
akin to a market-wide regulatory effort than to a more discrete conduct investi-
gation.
2. Private Enforcement
Systems analysis must also consider the role of private enforcement. Private
enforcement has been a hallmark of the US system of competition law
enforcement since its inception, with the powerful incentives to private suit
offered by the treble damages remedy and class action device.102 Private remedies
have been available in Canada since 1976.103 The European Commission
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98 OFT, supra n 2, para 4.9.
99 M Aitken, remarks at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon (27 October 2009), infra pp 32–33.
100 For example, Paul Gorecki noted a specific example in Ireland in the wine industry, in which
price freezes were opposed by competition authorities but supported by consumer protection
enforcers. P Gorecki, remarks at the Fourth Antitrust Marathon (27 October 2009), infra p 34.
101 See ME Stucke, “New Antitrust Realism” [January 2009] Global Competition Policy 4, available at
papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1323815.
102 See M Huffman, “A Standing Framework for Private Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement”
(2007) 60 SMU Law Review 103, 103–04.
103 Competition Act § 36 (permitting private claims for harm suffered (not including punitive
damages) with a two-year statute of limitations). See RP McAfee, HM Mialon and S Mialon,
“Private versus Public Antitrust Enforcement: A Strategic Analysis” (2008) 92 Journal of Public
Economics 1863.
recently clarified the standards under which private damages actions are
permissible for breaches of Articles 81 and 82.104 No system worldwide has relied
as heavily on private enforcement as has the US.105
There are difficult questions whether private competition law enforcement is
consistent with the efficiency goals of competition law. Private litigants may be
wrongly incentivised to pursue the efficiency goals of competition law.106 Public
agencies charged with remedying market-wide competitive harms are less likely
to engage in strategic litigation favouring individual results over social welfare.107
But in general, the past decade has seen an increase in the availability of
private damages actions worldwide.108 Meanwhile, since 1977 decisions by
federal courts in the US have severely curtailed the availability of private
damages actions in competition law, imposing stringent standing limitations,109
pleading requirements110 and direct-purchase requirements,111 as well as limiting
the substantive causes of action.112
In contrast with competition law, where debates rage as to the propriety of a
private action,113 private enforcement of consumer protection laws seems entirely
appropriate. In the US system many consumer protection statutes provide
specific incentives in the form of statutory minimum damages and attorney fees
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104 See European Commission, supra n 31, paras 15–17, 5–6. The Commission has “suggest[ed]”
representative actions by consumer associations or trade associations and “opt-in collective
actions” as possible complements to the damages remedy.
105 See DA Crane, supra n 16, draft, 2.
106 See ibid, draft, 2–3, 7–8 (“private parties who sue antitrust defendants typically will not be suing to
vindicate the interests of the consumers who stopped buying the goods because they were too
expensive but only for the purchasers who did buy and incurred an overcharge”).
107 See W Page, remarks at the FTC Workshop on Section 5 of the FTC Act as a Competition
Statute (17 October 2008), Tr 99 (attributing to this author the belief that “the FTC is in a
different position from the private plaintiff run amuck”, who might be analogised “to the herders
in the tragedy of the commons story, who damage the public interest by their single-minded
pursuit of private gain”). Cf WE Kovacic, Dissenting Statement, Crude Oil Price Manipulation
Rulemaking (2009), 2 and n 10 (noting an increased concern for excessive enforcement of the
FTC’s petroleum market manipulation rule if private enforcement occurs under state “Baby
FTC” Acts interpreted coextensively with the FTC Act), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2009/08/P082900mmr_kovacic.
108 Crane, supra n 16, draft, 2.
109 See Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, 429 US 477 (1977).
110 See Twombly, supra n 29. Twombly is not limited to private claims, but applies equally to public
enforcement. For a variety of reasons, however, the pleading requirements imposed by Twombly
affect private plaintiffs uniquely. See M Huffman, supra n 27.
111 See Illinois Brick, supra n 69. By contrast, indirect purchaser suits are expressly permitted in the EU.
See European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules
§ 2.1, 4 (2 April 2008).
112 For one of many examples, see Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209
(1993) (predatory pricing claims).
113 See, eg McAfee et al, supra n 103, 1–2 (noting strategic misuses of antitrust laws in cases such as
Utah Pie Co v Continental Baking, 386 US 85 (1967)). Consumer enforcement presents the differing
problems of possible abusive class litigation and incentives improperly aligned with the purposes of
antitrust enforcement. See Huffman, supra n 102, 114; Huffman, supra n 27.
for successful plaintiffs.114 Private consumer protection enforcement rarely
involves concerns for strategic litigation by competitors.115 The harm sought to
be remedied by the legal scheme is the harm in the individual transaction, so
there is a perfect alignment of interests between the consumer plaintiff and the
legal scheme. Although anti-regulation zealots might contend market forces
obviate the need for consumer protection regulation entirely, where it exists it is
difficult to cavil with imposing a private right of action and remedy.
E. CONCLUSION
This issue paper discusses the question whether and how the integration of
competition law and consumer protection can be accomplished. The differing
understandings of consumer harm, and the remedy for that harm, between the
disciplines presents ostensible tension. But there is room for common
enforcement theories. Only where consumer protection serves to remove
consumer choice, by targeting substantive transaction terms, are the disciplines
actually irreconcilable.
Systems of enforcement also may differ between the fields. Private
enforcement is a more natural fit for consumer protection than for competition
law because of the focus consumer protection places on individual consumer
transactions. Circumstances will exist in which competition law is better left to
government enforcers. Within agencies, combining consumer protection and
competition law has obvious efficiency benefits, but the extent of benefit in the
products of the agencies’ work is less clear.
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115 Consider, however, the circumstance of intellectual property protection, a form of consumer
protection regulation traditionally enforced by competitors rather than consumers.
